Florida Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 4

Article 6

June 1972

Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies
Adequate?
William J. McCabe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William J. McCabe, Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies Adequate?, 24 Fla. L.
Rev. 721 (1972).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

McCabe: Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies Adeq
1972]

PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS

PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN FLORIDA: ARE PRESENT
REMEDIES ADEQUATE?
Theft of trade secrets is a growing concern for many industries in the
nation.' As the cost of research and development increase2 the theft of
trade secrets becomes a lucrative, although somewhat immoral, alternative
to the expenditure of one's own funds. The art of industrial espionage has
reached such a high level of sophistication 3 that some companies pay
executives 35,000 dollars a year to combat the problem. 4 Yet of the estimated
$3 billion worth of trade secrets stolen annually, only five per cent are
obtained through industrial espionage; the remainder being learned by
employees in the course of their employment and later utilized by them
or their subsequent employers.Industrial spokesmen have long realized the need for adequate protection of trade secrets: "Ideas are the life blood of R & D [research and
development]. And they are expensive. It's vital that the law offer protection from the unscrupulous person or company who would market another
company's ideas." 6 In response to increased stealing and corresponding
pressure from industry, twenty-one statesY recently enacted statutes making
the theft of trade secrets a crime. Florida, although ranking second in manufacturing establishments in the southeast, s does not provide businessmen
with criminal remedies specifically aimed at commercial piracy.
This note will explore the protection Florida provides for trade secrets
through civil and criminal remedies. The shortcomings of the present protections will be analyzed. Finally, proposals will be suggested for new
criminal sanctions specifically directed toward the theft of trade secrets.
1. See Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Inforination, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 911 (1967).
2. Bus. WzEE, May 23, 1970, at 102.
3. See LIFE, May 20, 1966, at 38; Comment, supra note 1, at 911 n.6 (devices used by
industrial pirates).
4. Brown, The Ugliest Competition: Marhet Espionage, SALEs MANAGEMENT, Dec. 4,
1964, at 23.
5. See Vandevoort, Trade Secrets: Protecting a Very Special "Property," 26 Bus. LAW.
681, 692 (1971).
6. IRON AGE, Feb. 27, 1969, at 51.
7. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§41-3949 to -3951 (Supp. 1969); CAL. PENAL CODE §499(c) (West
1970); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. §40-5-33 (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. §26-1809 (Supp. 1971);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§15-1 to -9, 16-1 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §§10-3048 to -3052 (Supp.
1970); ME. RLV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §2113 (Supp. 1971); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 266, §§30(4),
60A (1968); MICH. Comp.LAWS §§752.771-.773 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.52 (Supp.
1971); NEB. REv. STAT. §§28-548.01 to .03 (Supp. 1969); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §580:32
(Supp. 1971); N.J. REV. STAT. §§2A:119-5.1 to -5.5 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. §40A-16-23
(Supp. 1969); N.Y. PENAL CODE §§155.00 (6), .30(3), 165.07 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§14-75.1 (1969); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§1333.51, .99 (Page Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, §1732 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. tit. 18, §48992 (Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. §21-4238
to -4240 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. §943.204 (Supp. 1971).
8. FLORIDA STATLsTCAL ASnmAcr 336 (1970). In 1968 Florida had 7,706 manufacturing
establishments. Id. at 340. During 1960-1966 Florida had 4,255 new plants and plant
expansions with 701 more in 1967 and 941 in 1968. Id. These plants provided a payroll
of nearly $2.5 billion in 1966. Id. at 337.
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DEFINITION OF A TRADE SECRET

A trade secret has generally been defined as "any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it." 9 Common examples of trade secrets include formulas, 10
manufacturing processes," know-how,'12 machinery,13 designs, 1" customer
lists, 15 and business information.16 On the other hand, many similar items

such as recipes1 7 and food processing methods 8 have not been considered
trade secrets. Thus, it is often difficult to determine in advance whether a
particular item will be considered a trade secret. Among the factors examined
by the courts are: (1) the degree of secrecy, (2) the extent to which measures
are taken to maintain secrecy, (3) the amount of effort or cost required to
develop the secret, and (4) the degree of difficulty required by others to
duplicate the secret.' 9
Florida courts have utilized such factors in determining trade secret
status. 20 Thus, items lacking secrecy, such as a machine obtainable on the
open market, have been denied trade secret protection. 2 Similarly, items
easily and cheaply duplicated, such as customer lists, which can be found
in the classified section of the telephone book, have been denied trade secret
status."2 Trade secret protection, however, has been granted to customer

9. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs §757, comment b at 5 (1939).
10. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D. Del. 1920) (soft-drink
formula); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (3d D.C.A. Fla.).
cert. denied, 120 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1960) (formula for insect exterminator). For additional
examples of trade secrets see R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRMS §2.09 (1971).
11. E.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971) (process for producing menthanol).
12. E.g., Segal Lock & Hardware Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 143 F.2d 935 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 791 (1944) (method of picking locks).
13. E.g., Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960)
(machinery for manufacture of polyurethane foam).
14. E.g., Trodyne Corp. v. Femina, 154 U.S.P.Q. 566 (S.D. Fla. 1967), aJ'd except
as to damages, Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968) (design
for helicopter blade pressure-sensing mechanism); Bert Lane Co. v. International Indus.,
Inc., 84 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1955) (design of musical carousel).
15. E.g., Bert Lane Co. v. International Indus., Inc., 84 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1955); Inland
Rubber Corp. v. Helman, 237 So. 2d 291 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
16. E.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (3d D.CA. Fla.),
cert. denied, 120 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1960) (method of insect extermination and customer
prices).
17. Pure Foods, Inc. v. Sir Sirloin, Inc., 84 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1955) (batter for cooking
meats).
18. Id. (method of processing and packaging meats).
19. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS §757, comment b at 6 (1939).
20. E.g., Pure Foods, Inc. v. Sir Sirloin, Inc., 84 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1955); Inland Rubber
Corp. v. Helman, 237 So. 2d 291 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
21. Pure Foods, Inc. v. Sir. Sirloin, Inc., 84 So. 2d 51, 54 (Fla. 1955).
22. Id. at 53; Simms v. Burnette, 55 Fla. 702, 46 So. 90, 91 (1908) (wholesale dealers
and customers of liquor dealers are not trade secrets).
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lists that require a great deal of expense and effort to produce and that are
23
difficult to duplicate by honest means.
The protection is unavailable, however, against one who has discovered
the secret through independent research or by reverse engineering. 24 Protection extends only against those who improperly obtain a trade secret and
2
not against those finding the secret by honest means. 5
COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN FLORIDA

With the present lack of statutory protection in Florida, various common
law doctrines must be analyzed to determine the efficacy of civil protections
afforded trade secrets.
Employer-Employee Relationship
Express Contract. An employment contract may expressly prohibit an
employee from divulging certain information learned while working for
the employer. 26 These contracts, however, will not be enforced if considered
in restraint of trade.2 7 Florida Statutes, section 542.12, provides: "Every
contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
trade or business of any kind . . . is to that extent void." ' 28 Florida courts
have generally held that express contracts dealing with protection of trade
secrets do not violate the Florida Statutes, section 542.12.29
Any business with trade secrets requiring protection should insert an
employment clause expressly prohibiting its employees from divulging trade
secrets. To assure the effectiveness of such a clause the employer should list
in general terms what is considered a trade secret, such as "all price information, customer's lists, credit reports, and contracts and invoices of the Employer." 30 Many advantages can be derived by inserting such restrictive
clauses in employment contracts. 31
23. Inland Rubber Corp. v. Helman, 237 So. 2d 291 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970). See also
Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969) for a full discussion of customer lists as trade secrets.
24. Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chem., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1970). Reverse
engineering is the process by which a finished product is analyzed to determine its
contents or to determine the way in which it was manufactured.
25. Id.
26. Gulf Coast Refractory Serv., Inc. v. Green, 240 So. 2d 501 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1970);
Inland Rubber Corp. v. Heiman, 237 So. 2d 291 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1970).
27. See FLA. STAT. §542.12 (1) (1969).
28. FLA. STAT. §542.12 (1) (1969). Exceptions are provided for covenants not to compete
and for agreements to refrain from soliciting old customers.
29. In Inland Rubber Corp. v. Helman, 237 So. 2d 291 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970), a contract
prohibiting an employee from disclosing confidential information from the files of the
employer was held not to violate §542.12. A district court of appeal upheld an express contract not to divulge trade secrets learned during employment in Fountain v. Hudson Cush-NFoam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1960). In order to prevent the employee from
violating his non-disdosure contract with his employer a temporary injunction was issued
preventing the employee from working for a competing firm. Cf. Gulf Coast Refractory
Serv., Inc. v. Green, 240 So.2d 501 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1970).
30. Inland Rubber Corp. v. Helman, 237 So. 2d 291, 294-95 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
31. Such a clause clearly establishes that the items in question are considered confi-
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In addition, the employer should include a covenant not to compete for
a limited time after termination of employment. 32 Such an agreement effectively prevents an employee from utilizing trade secrets obtained during
employment. Moreover, a covenant not to compete33 will be upheld even
though the employer has no trade secret to protect.

Although express contracts may afford extensive protection, some companies are reluctant to use them because they fear employees might regard
the contract as an indication of distrust.34 These companies, therefore, turn
to other civil remedies to prevent employee espionage.
implied Contracts. Courts have generally held that every employment
contract contains an implied provision that precludes an employee's use of
confidential information.3 5 General knowledge gained by an employee in
the course of his employment, however, is not considered confidential and
may be used in future endeavors.3 6
Courts are reluctant, however, to grant an employer relief on an implied
contract.3 7 Strong policy reasons exist for allowing an individual to use his

dential by the employer. This eliminates a major problem faced by employees who must
rely on implied provisions. See text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
Additionally, in other jurisdictions employers have the right to prevent disclosure of
information by contract even though the information is not considered a trade secret. E.g.,
Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Standard Brands, Inc v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967). Florida recognizes this
right where the information is a customer list that does not attain trade secret status.
FLA. STAT. §542.12(2) (1969). Although there is no Florida case on point it is possible
Florida would grant protection to other items included in the restrictive clause that are
not considered trade secrets. Of course, in the absence of an express agreement employers
may not prevent disclosure of information that is not a trade secret. Renpak, Inc. v.
Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). See text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
Additionally, such a clause will give rise to a cause of action based on interference with
a contract in the event a third party induces the employee to divulge information in
violation of the contract clauses. See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
32. A covenant not to compete is not considered in restraint of trade and is enforceable if reasonable as to time and area. FLA. STAT. §542.12 (2) (1969).
33. Cf. Simms v. Burnette, 55 Fla. 702, 46 So. 90 (1908). In Simms a court of equity
refused to enforce a covenant not to compete in the absence of a trade secret. However,
the court did acknowledge that the employer had a remedy at law for breach of contract.
Additionally, Simms was decided before FLA. STAT. §542.12 (1969) was effectuated. Section
542.12 upholds covenants not to compete if they are reasonably limited in time and
area. Other jurisdictions construing similar statutes have enforced covenants not to compete when there was no trade secret to protect. E.g., Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chem.,
Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
34. MANAGEENT REv., June 1970, at 58. Additional disadvantages of express contracts are noted in R. MILGRIM, supra note 10, §3.02 (2).
35. E.g., Bert Lane Co. v. International Indus., Inc., 84 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1955); Renpak,
Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
36. Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
37. E.g., E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 41 Del. Ch.
533, 200 A.2d 428 (1964); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960). In Wexler
v. Greenberg the court said: "Were we to measure the sentiment of the law by the weight
of both English and American decisions in order to determine whether it favors protecting
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knowledge and experience obtained during employment.38 To restrict such
use may substantially limit an individual's ability to earn a living in the
occupation of his choice. For this reason a court may be reluctant to find
that the information disclosed was confidential. 39
Fiduciary or Confidential Relationship
A fiduciary is prohibited from using to his own advantage or from disclosing to third persons trade secrets obtained during the fiduciary period.4
This duty may continue even after expiration of the fiduciary period 41 or
prior to the formation of such relationship. 42 To obtain relief for a breach
thereof, the injured party must show the fiduciary possessed a trade secret
that he revealed during the period of a confidential relationship and that
the secret was disclosed in violation of the fiduciary's obligation. 43
This theory affords trade secret protection in a wide variety of business situations. Proving that the information was revealed in confidence
44
is often difficult, however.
Improper Discovery of a Trade Secret by Third Persons
Liability for improper use of a trade secret is not limited to the existence
of a confidential or contractual relationship between the owner and the

a businessman from certain forms of competition or protecting an individual in his unrestricted pursuit of a livelihood, the balance would heavily favor the latter. 399 Pa. at 577,
160 A.2d at 435.
38. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 41 Del. Ch.
533, 547-48, 200 A.2d 428, 437 (1964); Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1958). In duPont the court said: "Among the substantial and conflicting policies
at play in this situation are the protection of employers' rights in their trade secrets on
the one hand, versus the right of the individual to exploit his talents, the matters of
general knowledge, and pursue his calling without undue hindrance from a prior employer on the other .. . . It is hard to ask a man to work in a trade secret area and
thereby circumscribe his possible future liberty of action and the use of the knowledge
and skill which are inextricably interwoven with his knowledge of the trade secrets." 41
Del. Ch.547-48, 200 A.2d at 437.
39. For the information to be considered confidential the employee must know or have
reason to know the information is secret. J. T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy &
Sons, Inc., 260 N.E.2d 723 (Mass. 1970); National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d
I (Mo. 1966).
40. Fulton v. Clewiston, 100 Fla. 257, 129 So. 773 (1930); RESTATEMENT oF AGENCY
§§395, 396 (1933).
41. Connelly v. Special Road & Bridge Dist., 99 Fla. 456, 126 So. 794 (1930).
42. Mann v. Tatgel Chem. Co., 201 Kan. 326, 440 P.2d 640 (1968); RESTATEMENT oF
AGENCY §395, comment d at 222 (1933).
43. General Steel Prods. Co. v. Lorenz, 204 F. Supp. 518, 539 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
44. E.g., Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 605, 612 (S.D.
Fla. 1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967). For factors used by the courts to determine
the existence of a confidential relationship see Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Cal. 1966). To avoid this problem the
trade secret owner should always create a confidential relationship by contract before
disclosing his trade secret.
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person utilizing the secret in an improper manner. For example, third persons may wrongfully obtain possession of trade secrets. The injured owner
is afforded various means of protection, however.
Common Law Copyright. At common law an intellectual production is
a property right prior to publication. 45 If a trade secret is considered an
intellectual production46 the secret will be protected by the common law
copyright.47 Once the secret is published or dedicated to the public, however,
the common law protection is terminateds4 8 and the owner must look to other
means of protection.

4

9

Civil Conspiracy. Florida also recognizes a cause of action based on civil
conspiracy. 50 To prove conspiracy the complainant must show a malicious
or wanton interference with his business. 51 Thus, when a group of persons
conspire to improperly obtain a trade secret the owner has a cause of action
52
based on a civil conspiracy theory.
Interference with a Contract. Interference with a contract, a tort in
4
Florida,53 gives the injured party an action against the interfering party.5
Thus, when a third party entices a competitor's employee to divulge confidential information in violation of the employment contract 5 the employer
may sue the third party for the interference.5 6

45. Glazer v. Hoffman, 153 Fla. 809, 814, 16 So. 2d 53, 55 (1943).
46. Clothes designs are examples of trade secrets that come under this category. See
Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Mfg., 106 So. 2d 233 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
47. In Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Mfg., 106 So. 2d 233 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1958), relief was granted for theft of a coat design. In Glazer v. Hoffman, 153 Fla. 809,
16 So. 2d 53 (1943), plaintiff claimed common law copyright for a magical trick.
48. Glazer v. Hoffman, 153 Fla. 809, 814, 16 So. 2d 53, 55 (1943).
49. See text accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
50. Faulk v. Allen, 152 Fla. 413, 12 So. 2d 109 (1943). In order to prove a civil conspiracy there must be: (I) a conspiracy between two or more parties; (2) the doing of an
unlawful act or the doing of a lawful act by unlawful means; (3) the doing of some
overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy; and (4) damage to plaintiff as a result of the
acts done under the conspiracy. Renpack, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1958).
51. Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642, 646 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
52. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (3d D.C.A. Fla.),
cert. denied, 120 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1960); Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
53. Harvey Corp. v. Universal Equip. Co., 158 Fla. 644, 653, 29 So. 2d 700, 704 (1947).
54. Id.
55. Third parties have gone to great lengths to entice employees to reveal secret information. In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671,
192 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appellant paid appellee's employee 33% more salary than
appellee paid him in order to entice the employee to work for appellant and reveal secret
information possessed by appellee.
56. Orkin Exterminating Co. v, Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (3d D.C.A. Fla.),
cert. denied, 120 So. 2d 619 (1960).
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Discovery of a Trade Secret by Improper Means. Some jurisdictions hold
it is a tort to obtain a trade secret by any improper means.57 "Improper
means" obviously includes situations where trade secrets are obtained
through theft or fraud. Trade secrets, however, may be improperly appropriated even though no law has been violated nor any specific tort committed.48 For example, in E. L duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher5
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the defendants liable when
they obtained a trade secret by taking aerial photographs of the plaintiff's
new plant. The court noted that no confidential relation had been broken
and conceded there had been no trespass. Nevertheless, the court held: "To
obtain knowledge of a process without spending the time and money to
discover it independently is improper unless the holder voluntarily dis60
closes it or fails to take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy."
No trade secret case predicated upon a discovery by improper means
has been decided in Florida. If, however, a trade secret is obtained against
the owner's will and the owner makes reasonable efforts to protect the trade
secret, Florida would probably recognize the cause of action. 61
RELATION OF TRADE SECRETS TO FEDERAL STATUTORY ACTs

The law of trade secrets is based on state common law. However, there
are certain instances when state trade secret protection may overlap federal
enactments. In these areas an owner of a trade secret may prefer federal
protection rather than state common law protection.

Patents
If a trade secret fulfills the requirements of novelty, utility, and unobviousness6- the owner may prefer to obtain a patent rather than rely on
57. E.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290 (5th
Cir. 1970) (dicta); Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1969) (dicta).
58. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
59. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). This case has been the subject of numerous law
review articles. See, e.g., Note, Aerial Photography of Plant Construction To Obtain a
Trade Secret Is an Unlawful Appropriation, 8 Hous. L. Rav. 574 (1971); Comment, Trade
Secrets-Aerial Photography Is an Improper Means of Acquiring a Trade Secret when
CountervailingDefenses Are Not Reasonably Available to the Owner of the Trade Secret
and Trade Secrets May Be Properly Discovered only by Reverse Engineering, Independent
Research, or if the Owner Voluntarily Reveals the Secret, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 247 (1970).

60. 431 F.2d at 1015-16.
61. Florida trade secret law has been interpreted to be the same as that in AM. JUR. Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1968). AM. Ju. asserts that
discovering a trade secret by "improper means" does state a cause of action. 42 Am. JuR.
2d Injunctions §75 (1969). Most likely, Florida courts will interpret the state trade secret

law in a similar manner.
62. Types of patentable trade secrets include various manufacturing processes, Vitro
Corp. v. Hall Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1961), and computer programs, In re
Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968). For a discussion of protection of computer software
generally, see Note, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L, Rmv. 909 (1970).
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state law for protection.63 Once a patent is granted all protection based on
trade secrets is forfeited because of the full disclosure of the secret. Trade
secret protection, however, is afforded while a patent application is pend64
ing.
A decision to patent a trade secret depends on many factors. 65 Although
it is often advantageous to obtain a patent many well-known products have
not been patented, 66 the owners being content with existing trade secret
protection.
Copyright
A trade secret may be copyrighted under federal law if it can be considered a "writing of an author." 67 Obtaining a copyright relinquishes any
claim to trade secret protection, since publication is required for this statutory copyright. 68 Furthermore, complete protection is not afforded because
a copyright prohibits only the copying of a work and not its use.6 9 Thus,
the building of a structure from architectural plans has been found not to
70
be an infringement of a copyright.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act
The Sherman Act prohibits both conspiracies in restraint of trade7 1 and
attempts to monopolize trade among the states. 72 Misappropriation of trade
secrets have occasionally been prosecuted under these statutes when they
were part of a general scheme or conspiracy to unlawfully restrain the
63. Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1970). There has recently been
much controversy over the extent of trade secret protection that state courts can grant
without infringing upon federal jurisdiction. This concern has been caused by three recent
cases: Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 224 (1964); Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). The effect of these cases on trade secret law is beyond
the scope of this note and has been fully discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Milgrim, Sears
to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 17 (1971).
64. Southern Lead Corp. v. Glass, 103 Fla. 657, 138 So. 59 (1931).
65. A chart depicting the factors involved in determining whether patentability is
advisable is found in R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS §8.02 (8) (1971). The author also discusses
differences in protection between patents and trade secrets.
66. For example, the formulas for Coca-Cola and Chanel No. 5 are trade secrets.
TIME, Feb. 22, 1963, at 87.

67. Trade secrets that may be copyrighted include computer programs. See Note,
Computers, The Copyright Law and Its Revision, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 386 (1968).

68. 17 U.S.C. §10 (1970).
69. DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1962).
70. Id.
71. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970) providing in part: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
Violation of this section is
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .
a misdemeanor. Id.
72. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1970) providing in part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
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owner's interstate business.73 The Sherman Act, however, is often utilized as
a counterclaim by one who is accused of misappropriating trade secrets.7 4
The counterclaim is based on the presumption that the owner, by attempting
to prohibit use of certain information, is endeavoring to monopolize trade
75
among the states.
Civil Remedies
Although the common law may provide redress for trade secret misappropriation, available civil remedies78 may limit the desirability of such
protection. In Florida damages for appropriation of trade secrets have been
limited to the owner's loss, as opposed to the defendant's gain.7 7 Such

damages will not be satisfactory in many cases. For example, in Miami
Beach Lerner Shops v. Walco Manufacturing8 the plaintiff sought an accounting for profits from the defendant who had stolen the plaintiff's coat
designs and had 300 coats manufactured. The court indicated that, since
the plaintiff would have made only eighty-four cents profit per coat it was
entitled to only 252 dollars in damages. The court did not consider the
profits the defendant would have earned had it sold the coats. Thus, a defendant who steals a trade secret may profit from his illegal act. Punitive
damages, however, have been allowed to rectify this situation;79 but they
are rarely granted.80 Additionally, costs and attorney's fees have not generally been awarded to the trade secret owner.".
Florida courts have recognized an accounting for profits in many situations8 2 and would apparently award this remedy in lieu of damages in an
appropriate case. The courts have also recognized the use of a constructive
trust where "one, through actual fraud, abuse of confidence reposed and ac-

73. E.g., Vogue Instrument Corp. v. Lem Instruments Corp., 40 F.R.D. 497 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). In this case the plaintiff brought an action under 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1964) complaining, inter alia, that the defendant enticed plaintiff's employees to leave and that the
defendant used plaintiff's trade secrets. The court noted these complaints are usually
reached under state law but found the complaint also had a basis under the Sherman Act.
See also Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co., 284 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1960).
74. E.g., Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F2d 809 (7th Cir. 1970); Glass Laboratories,
Inc. v. Crystal, 165 U.S.P.Q. 647 (N.J. Super. 1970).
75. Glass Laboratories, Inc. v. Crystal, 165 U.S.P.Q. 647 (N.J. Super. 1970).
76. These civil remedies are damages, accountings for profits, and injunctive relief.
For less common remedies see Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HAv. L. REv.
976, 982-83 (1951).
77. E.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (3d D.C.A. Fla.),
cert. denied, 120 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1960); Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Mfg.,
106 So. 2d 233 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
78. 106 So. 2d 233 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
79. Id.
80. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (3d D.C.A. Fla.),
cert. denied, 120 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1960).
81. Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968) (interpreting
Florida law).
82. E.g., Luckie v. McCall Mfg. Co., 153 So. 2d 311 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
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cepted, or through other questionable means gains something for himself
which in equity and good conscience he should not be permitted to hold." 13
Additional problems are created through the use of an injunction. Federal courts have disagreed on the length of an injunction in trade secret
cases . 4 In Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen Qualley Co.8 5 a defendant who obtained a trade secret by improper means was permanently enjoined from
making use of that secret, even after the secret became known to the public.
In another circuit, however, the court held that a person wrongfully obtaining a trade secret should be enjoined from using it until the trade secret
becomes known to the public8s In a Fifth Circuit case interpreting Florida
law s7 the court granted a permanent injunction but did not indicate a
preference for either rule.8
Florida courts have granted only temporary injunctions in prohibiting
the use of misappropriated trade secrets.89 They have refused to use an injunction as a punitive measure where the trade secret had been made
public.9° Although injunctive relief is within the court's discretion, 91 such
relief "should never be broader than is necessary to secure to the injured
party, without injustice to the adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the particular case. ' ' 92 Thus, Florida courts will generally grant
an injunction only while the trade secret remains a secret.
SHORTCOMINGS

OF CIVIL REMEDIES

Trade secret law has become confused because of the many different
93
theories of protection available. One commentator has stated:
There is no legal jargon by which various kinds of cases can be labelled
and distinguished. Consequently whenever a new set of facts suggests

83. Cannova v. Carran, 92 So. 2d 614, 619 (Fla. 1957). Florida courts have not, however, utilized this remedy in a case involving trade secrets.
84. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949);
Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936).
85. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936).
86. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
87. Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968).
88. Id. The court upheld a permanent injunction because the appellants declined to
reveal the information they legitimately possessed before the misappropriation of appellee's
trade secrets. The court felt a permanent injunction was, under the circumstances, the
only proper relief for the appellees.
89. E.g., Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960);
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied,
120 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1960). The courts have, however, granted permanent relief in trade
secret cases on collateral matters such as the malicious interference with employment contracts. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Tnsly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (3d D.C.A. Fla.

1960).
90. Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Mfg., 106 So. 2d 233 (3d D.C.A. Fla.

1958).
91. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, 185 So. 2d 11 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
92. Florida Peach Orchards, Inc. v. State, 190 So. 2d 796, 798 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
93.

A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SEcRETS 3 (1962).
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the possible existence of a trade secret and a breach of confidence
in relation to it, it becomes necessary in practice to review the whole
field of cases on trade secrets. No one case or group of cases can safely
be regarded as providing the answer to the facts of any problem under
consideration.
Furthermore, the decision involving trade secrets are often unclear as to
tie ground upon which relief was granted. 94 As a result it is difficult to
initially determine the outcome of a particular case or even the legal theory
upon which one should proceed.
An additional shortcoming of civil remedies is the prohibitive cost of
litigation, especially to the new or small enterprise. 95 For example, in
Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp.90 the plaintiff had to pay 12,500 dollars
in attorney's fees and expenses to litigate his claim. Although the plaintiff
may eventually prevail, these costs are not usually assigned to the defendant. 7 The Florida supreme court has stated "attorneys' fees cannot be
taxed as costs in any cause unless authorized by contract or legislative
authority."98 Since fewer than fifty per cent of the trade secret cases litigated are won by the plaintiff,99 a company, especially a small company, may
be wary of litigation when the costs are so prohibitive.
Moreover, relief in trade secret cases is often belated. 00 The small researcher is again the most adversely affected, since he may miss an opportunity to realize the full benefit from his secret.' 0' He will probably lose his
competitive advantage, especially if the defendant continues to utilize the
secret during litigation. Although a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
defendant from utilizing the secret is possible, such relief usually requires
the posting of a substantial bond.10 2 The bond plus the cost of litigation

94. E.g., Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Mfg., 106 So. 2d 233 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1958). In this case it was not clear whether relief was based on a common law copyright or on a breach of a confidential relation. Relief could have been granted on either
ground.

95. Legal expenses for the preparation of a complex trade secret case usually exceed
.550,000. R-MILGRIMt, TRADE SECRLrS §7.01 (1971). In Carter Prods. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md. 1963), the appellant's attorneys' fees exceeded $500,000.
96. 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968).
97. Id. at 228.
98. Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla. 1956). The court said this rule could
be modified where fraud or malice existed. In Pure Foods, Inc. v. Sir Sirloin, Inc., 84 So.
2d 51 (Fla. 1955), the costs were originally assigned to the defendants. However, the costs
were reassigned to the plaintiffs when the court determined no trade secret had been stolen.
99. J. PAT. OFF.Soc'y, Aug. 1968, at 536.
100. One case on record, concerning the misappropriation of the formula for "Rise"
shaving cream, took nearly 10 years of litigation before the issues were resolved. The
case commenced with Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557 (D.
Md. 1955), and terminated with Carter Prods. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383
(D. Md. 1963). This case is by no means unique. See Wall Street J., Sept. 13, 1966, at 7,
col. 2.
101. See IRON AcE, Feb. 27, 1969, at 51.
102. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.610 (b).
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may substantially impair working capital, thus limiting the defendant's
chance to make use of his secret before his competitors.
The efficacy of civil remedies is largely dependent upon the solvency of
the defendant.103 Since relief sought is often in the millions of dollars, the
0 4
insolvent defendant is a common occurrence.
Furthermore, the manufacturer utilizing a stolen trade secret may be a
foreign corporation, thus making jurisdiction difficult to obtain. This situation has recently prevented pharmaceutical companies in the United States
from seeking desired relief.105 Additionally, action against the thieves is
pointless, since they are often judgment proof. Thus, in many instances
the trade secret owner is without an adequate civil remedy.
Proof of damages is usually difficult to establish and damages are awarded in Florida only when they can be calculated with reasonable certainty.","
Therefore, a party could be admittedly damaged, but because of the difficulty
in proving its extent he may be denied compensation. 0 7 In other cases the
damages awarded may not reflect the real loss sustained by the injured
08
party.
Another shortcoming of civil remedies is their failure as a deterrent. The
potential gain realized by a trade secret thief is unlimited. With the high
cost of research and development a failing business may find incentive to
steal the research of a competitor rather than spend money to develop its
own research. If the thief is caught, an accounting for profit requires only
the return of the profits made from the theft.
The American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law has proposed a Uniform Trade Secret Protection Act.0 9 Enactment would be beneficial in eliminating many of the present shortcomings
of civil remedies. First, the Act clarifies the type of relief available. It defines
103. See Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical
Information, 14 U.C.L.A.L. R.-V. 911, 927 (1967).
104. See Hancock v. State, 402 SAV.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (computer programs
valued at $2.5 million).
105. Thieves were stealing drug secrets from American corporations and selling them
to foreign drug companies where patent protection was not available for pharmaceuticals.
The foreign companies would manufacture the drugs and sell them throughout the world,
including the United States. These foreign companies were beyond the jurisdiction of
American courts. See Fetterly, Historical Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating to the
Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 Bus. LAW. 1535, 1536-37 (1970).
106. E.g., Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968) (interpreting
Florida law); Pure Foods v. Sir Sirloin, Inc., 84 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1956); Miami Beach
Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Mfg., 106 So. 2d 233 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
107. This situation occurred in Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223 (5th
Cir. 1968).
108. See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra. See also Orkin Exterminating Co. v.
Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419, 424 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 120 So. 2d 619 (Fla.
1960). In Orkin the plaintiff had suffered various injuries resulting from defendants attempted enticing of plaintiff's employees, including the additional salary plaintiff paid its
employees to keep them from working for the defendant. The court did not allow this
as damages, since they were not proximately caused by the defendants' activities. 117 So.
2d at 424.
109. ABA TRADEMARKS 9. COPYRIGHTS SECrION, REPORT 232 (1971).
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a trade secret,110 states the conditions under which relief is available,"'
and precludes relief other than that provided by the Act. 12 Second, it clarifies the remedies available." 3 The successful plaintiff is given his choice of
damages:" 4 either the loss suffered by him or the benefit obtained by the
thief. Finally, the Act provides that treble damages and attorneys' fees may
be awarded to the successful plaintiff at the court's discretion."0

The Act, however, does not solve all the problems involved in a civil
litigation of a trade secret theft. The trade secret owner must still pay a
substantial fee to litigate his claim. Though he may recover these costs they

are not guaranteed. Additionally, the remedies under the Act necessitate a
solvent defendant, without which litigation is of little value.

Nevertheless, the proposed Uniform Trade Secret Protection Act would
remedy many defects present in Florida law. Its passage should therefore

be seriously considered.
THE DESIRABILITY OF CRIMINAL REMEDIES

Often the activities of a trade secret thief bring his conduct within the
provisions of a criminal statute. Because criminal remedies have inherent
benefits that the civil remedies lack it might be advantageous for the injured
party to seek prosecution under the criminal statute violated, even in
states where the Uniform Trade Secret Protection Act has been adopted.
Prosecution under a criminal statute will transfer the cost of litigation
to the state. Thus, the injured party will not have funds impaired during
prosecution and will be fully able to exploit his secret. In addition, more
commercial pirates may be prosecuted, since the state may have the necessary
funds to prosecute; this is especially desirable where the trade secret owner
is financially unable to initiate civil action.
Criminal prosecution of trade secret thieves might serve as a deterrent
to others. When the thief is convicted in a civil action he loses little. With
the possibility of imprisonment the potential thief may be deterred from
committing the illegal act.
Finally, the insolvency of the commercial pirate would no longer be a
factor in deciding whether to prosecute. Under criminal sanctions the thief
could be punished, even though the injured party cannot be compensated
for his loss. Since the state can prosecute an insolvent, whereas a company
would most likely forgo litigating a claim against such an individual, this
increased prosecution of trade secret thieves should result.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. (proposed Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act §1 (4)).
Proposed Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act §1 (4), at 233.
Id. §10, at 234.
Id. §4, at 233.
Id. §4 (b), at 233.
Id. §4, at 233.
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PRESENT CRIMINAL PROTECTION IN FLORIDA

The actions of a trade secret thief may often bring him within the provisions of Florida criminal statutes, such as larceny,11 embezzlement, 17
robbery," s conspiracy, "1 0 and receiving stolen goods. 2° Although prosecution
for the theft of trade secrets has been attempted in other states under
larceny121 and embezzlement statutes1 22 it has not been attempted under
Florida's criminal statutes. The present criminal laws, however, may afford
trade secret protection in some situations. The possible use of criminal laws,
however, creates many problems.
Larceny
The applicable provisions of the Florida larceny statute provide:123
A person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his
property or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same
to the use of the taker, or of any other person: (a) Takes from the
possession of the true owner, or of any other person . . . or secretes,

withholds, or appropriates to his own use, or that of any person other
than the true owner, any money, personal property, goods and chattels,
thing in action, evidence of debt, contract, or property, or article of
value of any kind . . . (c) . . . steals such property, and is guilty of
larceny ....

The Taking. A requirement for a conviction under the larceny statute
is an asportation of the item. 2 4 In the trade secret area this element could
easily be circumvented by memorizing, copying, or conveying the contents
to a third party via the telephone without a taking of any tangible item.
Since many trade secrets are stolen by former employees who have copied
or memorized them, this defect in the larceny statute becomes significant.
Although no Florida cases are on point, the lack of a taking has been
acknowledged in other jurisdictions when the trade secret was copied or
2

memorized.1

5

116. FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1969).
117. FLA. STAT. ch. 812 (1969).
118. FA. STAT. §813 (1969).
119. FLA. STAT. §833.01 (1969).
120. FLA. STAT. §811.16 (1969).
121. E.g., People v. Dolbeer, 214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573 (Ist Dist. 1963):
Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
122. E.g., State v. Talek, 90 N.J. Super. 61, 216 A.2d 242 (1966).
123. FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1969).
124. E.g., Driggers v. State, 96 Fla. 232, 118 So. 20 (1928); Harper v. State, 141 So. 2d 606
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
125. E.g., United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1966) (dicta): People v.
Dolbeer, 214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573, 575 (Ist Dist. 1963) (dicta).
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Permanent Deprivation. The larceny statute also requires a showing of
specific intent to permanently deprive the true owner of his property. 126 A
commercial pirate may thus avoid the effect of the larceny statute only by
copying or memorizing a trade secret. Furthermore, a thief could steal a
trade secret, such as a mechanical device used in a factory, with the intent
to return it after analysis. The thief could not be prosecuted successfully
under the larceny statute because he has not intended to permanently deprive the true owner of the property. This defense has been recognized by
the courts in connection with trade secret prosecutions under other states'
larceny statutes. 127 Thus, the requirement of specific intent is not suited
to the protection of trade secrets.
Use and Benefit. In addition to a showing of an intent to permanently
deprive the owner of his property, larceny may be committed where there is
an intent to "deprive or defraud the true owner of his property or of the use
and benefit thereof." 22 8 It is conceivable, therefore, that when one copies or
memorizes a trade secret, he has in effect deprived the owner of the use
and benefit of the trade secret. Clearly, once the trade secret is used by
another the value of the secret has been minimized or destroyed because the
true owner no longer has exclusive control of the secret. However, even
though the value of the secret has been destroyed the owner has not been
deprived of its use or benefits.
Florida has not ruled on the meaning of "use and benefit" in connection
with the larceny statute, but other courts have held that "value" and "use
and benefit" are not synonymous. 129 Thus, memorizing, copying, or transmitting a trade secret by telephone may not deprive the owner of its use and
benefit.
The "Property" Requirement
A major problem with the Florida larceny statute involves the determination of whether a trade secret is property within the meaning of the statute.
Clearly, where the trade secret is embodied in some tangible form the item
stolen would be considered property. A problem arises when the trade secret
is memorized or copied, however. The larceny statute includes as larcenable
property "any money, personal property, goods and chattels, thing in action,
evidence of debt, contract, or property or article of value of any kind. ...
Personal Property. In criminal prosecutions of some states, trade secrets
have been ruled as personal property.' 3 ' In Hancock v. State' 32 the accused
126. Gaynor v. State, 196 So. 2d 19, 21 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1967).
127. E.g., People v. Dolbeer, 214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1st Dist. 1963);
State v. Gage, 272 Minn. 106, 136 N.W.2d 662 (1965).
128. FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1) (1969).
129. E.g., Jones v. State, 12 Tex. Ct. App. 424 (1882).
130. FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1) (a) (1969).
131. E.g., People v. Dolbeer, 214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573 (Ist Dist. 1963);
Hancock v. State, 402 S.V.2d 906 (rex. Crim. App. 1966).
132. 402 S.W.2d 906 (rex. Crim. App. 1966).
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was convicted of stealing secret computer programs from his employer by
copying them. The court convicted the accused of stealing personal property
under the Texas statute defining personal property as including "all writings
of every description, provided such property possesses any ascertainable
value.' 133 Since the programs had a value of $2.5 million the court concluded
they fell under the provision of the statute.
In People v. Dolbeer'3 4 a California court found that confidential lists
of telephone subscribers, embodied on paper, were personal property within
the meaning of the state's larceny statute. Since personal property had been
defined within this statute to include "goods," the court found such confidential lists to be physical goods.
Both cases are based on a delineation of what constitutes personal property. The courts, however, never actually equated trade secrets with personal
property, since the trade secrets were in tangible form.
The Florida larceny statute does not list items included as personal
property. 135 Florida case law on the subject deals only with tangible objects 30
and is therefore not helpful in ascertaining whether a trade secret is personal property. If the term "personal property" were interpreted broadly,
37
so as to include everything subject to ownership except real estate,1 it
would probably include trade secrets. Since felony statutes are construed
strictly in favor of the defendant,1 38 however, personal property under the
larceny statute would probably be limited to corporeal property. Therefore,
incorporeal property, such as trade secrets, is probably not included.
Goods. Since the term "goods" has been interpreted to include all personal
property, both corporeal and choses in action,'139 a trade secret could be
included in the term. Again, the Florida courts have not determined this
issue.
In United States v. BottonC140 the defendants were charged with illegal
transportation in interstate commerce of "any goods."'141 They had made
photocopies of purloined papers that detailed certain manufacturing processes. The papers were later returned to their original files, but the court
found that the photocopies were goods. Emphasizing, however, that the
manufacturing process itself was not considered goods the court pointed
TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1418 (1953).
214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1st Dist. 1963).
Other Florida statutes delineate what is meant by personal property. See, e.g.,
FLA.STAT. § 192.001 (i) (Supp. 1970).
136. E.g., McKenna v. State, 119 Fla. 576, 161 So. 561 (1935) (grapefruits); Waller v.
State, 213 So. 2d 623 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (painting attached to a wall).
137. See In re Estate of Home, 171 So. 2d 14 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965) (the court said:
"'Personal property' is a term which may be descriptive of a general species or class of
property, or it may refer to a particular division or category within the general class."
Id. at 16.
138. State ex rel. Cherry v. Davidson, 103 Fla. 954, 139 So. 177 (1931).
139. Epping v. Robinson, 21 Fla. 36 (1884).
140. 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
141. The prosecution was based on 18 U.S.C. §2314 (1970).
133.
134.
135.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/6

16

1972]

McCabe: Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies Adeq
PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS

out that a formula that was memorized and later placed in writing could
14 2
not be "goods" because no tangible object was taken.
Chattels. Chattels include "every species of property, movable or immovable, which is less than a freehold.' 143 Florida courts have not determined
if this encompassing term includes trade secrets, but other jurisdictions have
44
held, by implication, that the term "chattels" does not include trade secrets.
In Commonwealth v. Engleman 45 a prosecution based on the theft of trade
secrets was dismissed on the ground that the Massachusetts larceny statute
did not include trade secrets as a larcenable item. The statute in question
included "personal chattels."' 4 Apparently, chattels are also strictly limited
to tangible items.
Articles of Value of Any Kind. The Florida larceny statute includes as
larcenable property any "article of value of any kind."' 47 A trade secret certainly has value, but the question remains whether it can be considered an
"article".
In Biber v. Miami14 the Florida supreme court interpreted this phrase
broadly. The petitioner was charged with stealing contracts between an exterminating company and its customers. Since the contracts had not been
signed by the customers the petitioner claimed they were valueless. The
court agreed they were valueless as evidence of a debt or contract, but concluded they had value to the company as customer lists. Furthermore, the
contracts would have value in the hands of a competing company. Thus,
the papers were considered an "article of value" and the petitioner's conviction was upheld. 49 Interestingly, the court reached this conclusion without
determining whether a customer list would qualify as a trade secret.
Since the papers themselves were valueless, the court in Biber arguably
found the information itself larcenable. Yet it seems doubtful the court
would reach the same result had the lists been memorized, since there would
not have been a taking of anything tangible. The term "article" apparently
connotes some tangible item; other courts construing the same phrase have
held that an "article of value" must be some material or tangible thing of
value.5 0 Nevertheless, the Biber decision may serve as precedent for the inclusion of trade secrets in the phrase "article of value."
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

365 F.2d at 393.
Curlington v. State, 80 Fla. 494, 496, 86 So. 344, 345 (1920).
E.g., Commonwealth v. Engleman, 336 Mass. 66, 142 N.E.2d 406 (1957).
336 Mass. 66, 142 N.E.2d 406 (1957).
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 266, §30 (2)(1968).
FLA. STAT. §811.02 (1) (a) (1969).

148. 82 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1955).
149. Id. at 748.
150. Gayer v. Whelan, 59 Cal. App. 2d 255, 138 P.2d 763 (4th Dist. 1943). This case
was interpreting CAL. PENAL CODE §319 (West 1970), which is not the California larceny
statute. Montana has an identical phrase of "article of value of any kind" in its larceny
statute but the scope of that phrase has not been ruled on by the courts of that state.
MoNT. R v.CoDEs ANN. §94-2701 (1) (Supp. 1969).
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Value. An additional difficulty in securing a conviction under the Florida
larceny statute is determining the value of the trade secret stolen. An item's
value need not be proved for a conviction of petit larceny in Florida,151
but proof of value is required for a conviction of grand larceny.152 Florida
courts generally determine value by the item's market value at the time of
theft. 153 This method presents difficulties in the trade secret area because
there is usually no ascertainable market value."5
When the stolen trade secret is embodied in some tangible form, as it
would have to be for a conviction under the Florida larceny statute, the
defendant may claim that the value of the item is no more than the value
of the tangible item representing the trade secret. This attempt has failed
in other states"5 and would probably fail in Florida.15
Embezzlement
Embezzlement may occur where one legally in possession of a trade secret
misappropriates the secret to his use or the use of another without permission of the true owner. 5 7 Thus, when trade secrets are appropriated
by someone in a position of trust with the owner, prosecution may possibly
occur under the theory of embezzlement. In Florida embezzlement may be
prosecuted under either the larceny statute or the separate embezzlement
statute. 58
The embezzlement of trade secrets has been successfuly prosecuted under
conventional statutes in other states," 59 but in those states the trade secret
embezzled was in some tangible form. 60 Since property subject to embezzlement is the same as that subject to larceny 6' the question of tangibility
also arises in a prosecution for embezzlement.
Receiving Stolen Property
When a competitor receives a stolen trade secret from a third party the
owner of the trade secret may seek prosecution of the competitor for receiving stolen property.16 2 Again, prosecutions of this type have been attempt151. McDaniel v. Sate, 221 So. 2d 758 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
152. Spencer v. State, 217 So. 2d 331 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
153. Id.
154. An alternative measure of value could be the cost of development.
155. E.g., Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
156. Cf. Biber v. Miami, 82 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1955). In Biber the defendant was convicted of petit larceny, hence the value of the stolen contracts was not determined.
Nevertheless, the court found value in the customer list and not the paper upon which
the list was embodied. Id. at 748.
157. FLA. STAT. §§811.021 (1)(b), 812 (1969).
158. See Casso v. State, 182 So. 2d 252 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (all former distinctions
between larceny and embezzlement are abolished and merged into one offense of larceny).
Compare FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1) (b) (1969), with FLA. STAT. ch. 812 (1969).
159. E.g., State v. Talek, 90 N.J. Super, 61, 216 A.2d 242 (1966).
160. Id.
161. Compare FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1) (a) (1969), with FLA. STAT. §811.021 (1) (b) (1969).
162. FLA. STAT. §811.16 (1969).
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ed in other states,' 6s and again the success has depended on the tangibility
of the item received. The same results would probably obtain in Florida,
since the property received must be larcenable or it could not have been
10 4

stolen.

Conspiracy
The Florida conspiracy statute materially enlarges the scope of common
law conspiracy.1615 A conspiracy occurs in Florida when, inter alia, two or
more persons conspire to commit any offense 6 or to cheat and defraud a
person of property. 67 Thus, when persons conspire to steal a trade secret a
prosecution for conspiracy may be successful if the trade secret were considered property. This would again depend on the tangibility of the trade
secret, as the courts probably would not find that the secret itself constituted
68
property.
DEsIRABILITY

OF A CRIMINAL TRADE SECRET STATUTE

The technicalities of the present criminal statutes preclude adequate
protection of trade secrets. To eliminate these inadequacies and grant protection to the owners of trade secrets, Florida should enact a statute providing criminal sanctions. A statute aimed specifically at the theft of trade
secrets would eliminate confusion over the criminal protection of trade
secrets. 6 9 Such a statute would also clearly indicate the intention of the
state to prosecute for the theft of trade secrets.
Although improved industrial security is the surest method of reducing
commercial piracy,'7- criminal sanctions would give industry necessary
remedies when their security measures fail. Since employee piracy is virtually
impossible to prevent by security measures alone, criminal sanctions may be
the only adequate deterrent.
An additional reason for protecting trade secrets is to entice industry
and business into Florida. Industry seeks assurance that their trade secrets
163. E.g., People v. Parker, 217 Cal. App. 2d 422, 217 Cal. Rptr. 716 (2d Dist. 1963).
164. Cf. Perez v. State, 220 So. 2d 397 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). The court stated an accused
must know the property was stolen.
165. Garsed v. Sugarman, 99 Fla. 191, 192, 126 So. 157 (1930).
166. FLA. STAT. §833.01 (1) (1969).
167. FLA. STAT. § §833.01 (4), .01 (5) (1969).
168. Compare People v. Dolbeer, 214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1st Dist.
1963) (conspiracy to steal trade secrets affirmed where trade secrets embodied in tangible
form), with Commonwealth v. Engleman, 356 Mass. 66, 142 N.E.2d 406 (1957) (indictment
alleging conspiracy to steal trade secrets dismissed where trade secrets were not considered
larcenable).
169. See N.J. Rav. STAT. §2A:119-5.1 (Supp. 1969), which provides: "It is the purpose
of this act to clarify and restate existing law with respect to crimes involving trade secrets
and to make clear that articles representing trade secrets, including the trade secrets
represented thereby, constitute goods, chattels, materials and property and can be the subject of criminal acts."
170. See Rogegerg, Company Management of Trade Secrets, 14 IDnA 217, 218 (1970)
for steps one company takes to protect its ideas.
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will be protected 171 and will locate in states that provide adequate protection. Other states have realized this and have passed criminal trade secret
2
statutes to lure more industry to their states.17
Florida has indicated a desire to attract business to the state. In furtherance of this goal, the legislature has created the Florida Development Commission' 73 whose duties are to "[e]ncourage research designed to further
new and more extensive uses of the natural and other resources of the state,
17 4
with a view to the developmint of new products and industrial processes."'
Additionally, the Commission is to help eliminate "any restrictions or
burdens imposed by law, or otherwise existing which adversely affect or retard
legitimate development and expansion of business, industry .... .. 175 It is
arguable that inadequate protection of trade secrets retards such legitimate
development.
PRESENT STATUTES DIRECTED AT THE THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS

Statutes condemning the theft of trade secrets can be found in antiquity'
Other nations have had criminal sanctions against the theft of trade secrets
for many years. 77 In the United States the desire for criminal sanctions resulted from two fairly recent drug cases. 178 One writer sees the desire to
protect trade secrets as a logical occurrence in the evolution of an industrial
nation.

17 9

Currently, twenty-two states'8 0 have recognized the criminal nature of
commercial piracy and have passed criminal statutes to rectify the situation.
In addition, the federal government has realized the value of protecting
trade secrets and has imposed numerous criminal sanctions against those
who steal governmental trade secrets.1s ' The widespread enactment of trade
secret statutes in the past decade gives credence to their inevitability. Many
states that have enacted such statutes have done so in recognition of the
grTowing national problem, even though those states do not have major

See text accompanying note 6 supra.
172. Nebraska passed its statute making it a crime to steal trade secrets as part of its
"open door policy" toward industry. See Note. Industrial Espionage-Nebraska's
New
171.

Felony, 45 NEB. L. REV. 644, 646 (1966).
173. FLA. STAT. §288.01 (1969).

174.

FLA. STAT. §288.03 (7) (1969).

175.

FLA. STAT. §288.03 (13) (1969).

176. The Hammurabic Code circa 2100 B.C. provided for the loss of an eye to one
observing forbidden secrets. Cutlip, History of Law, 59 Am. L. REV. 361, 368 (1925).
177.

E.g., PENAL CODE OF FRANCE art. 418; GERMAN PENAL REGULATIONS §17.

178. See United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966); American Cyanamid
Co. v. Sharff, 309 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1962).
179. Fetterley, Historical Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating to the Theft of
Trade Secrets, 26 Bus. LAW. 1535 (1970).
180. See note 7 supra.
181. 18 U.S.C. §793 (1970) (knowing transmission of defense information is a crime);
18 U.S.C. §794 (1970) (the Federal Espionage Act): 18 U.S.C. §1905 (1970) (disclosure of
a trade secret by a government employee is a crime).
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problems in the areas of industrial espionage. 8 2 Florida is a major industrial state, 83 yet its legislature has failed to enact a trade secret statute.
Florida's industry is most certain to demand a change in this position in
the near future.
The trade secret statutes of other states fall into either of two categories.
Some states have merely amended their present larceny statutes to include
trade secrets, 84 while others have enacted separate statutes dealing specifically
with the theft of trade secrets. 85 Regardless of the approach taken all the
statutes define a trade secret. 88 Many specifically eliminate as a defense the
fact that the trade secret was not taken with the intent to permanently
deprive the owner of it.87 Although theft by memorization is not always
expressly covered, 88 the copying of a trade secret, or the causing of the
trade secret to be copied, have been included within the scope of most
statutes.' Many states also make it a crime for one to give or promise to
give an inducement to one who furnishes a trade secret. 9 0
The efficacy of the present statutes providing criminal sanctions for the
theft of trade secrets is difficult to determine. There have been no reported
appellate cases of prosecution under any trade secret statute.' 9' The number
of unreported prosecutions that have occurred under these statutes is unknown, since most prosecutions are handled by local district attorneys, and
in most states there is no requirement to report such prosecutions to the
92
state attorney general.'
CONCLUSION

Florida has recognized numerous theories to protect the owner of a
stolen trade secret. Nevertheless, these theories have many shortcomings. On
182. Neither Arkansas nor Nebraska have a problem with industrial espionage, since
both states are primarily agricultural. Nevertheless, both of these states have criminal
statutes directed at the theft of trade secrets. Letter from Ray Thornton, Arkansas Att'y
Gen. to William J. McCabe, Nov. 2, 1971, on file with U. FLA. L. Rv.; Letter from
Clarence A. H. Meyer, Nebraska Att'y Gen. to William J. McCabe, Nov. 1, 1971, on file
with U. FLA. L. Ray.
183. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
184. E.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE §§155.00 (6), .30 (3), 165.07 (McKinney 1967).
185. E.g., NJ. Rav. STAT. §§2A:119-5.1 to -5.5 (Supp. 1969).
186. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §499c (a) (3) (West 1970); NJ. REv. STAT. §2A:119-5.2(c)
(Supp. 1969).
187. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §499c (d) (West 1970).
188. E.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE §165.07 (McKinney 1967). In two states copying is not
even prohibited. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §15-1 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-75.1 (1969).
189. E.g., NJ. REv. STAT. §2A: 119-5.3 (b) (Supp. 1969).
190. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §499c (c) (West 1970).
191. There have been some unreported prosecutions based on the criminal trade
secret statutes. California has had two prosecutions based on its statutes. ELECroNic NEws,
March 8, 1971, at 2, and Nebraska has had one although the charges in that case were
dropped. Letter from Clarence A. H. Meyer, supra note 182.
192. See, e.g., Letter from Paul J. Tschida, Minnesota Att'y Gen. to William J. McCabe,
Jan. 3, 1972, on file with the U. FLA. L. REV.; Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, New Mexico,
Ass't Att'y Gen. to William J. McCabe, Nov. 8, 1971, on file with the U. FLA. L. R~v.
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the civil side the law is confusing, and an injured party ventures into litigation with little assurance of success. The individual is often faced with high
expenses, possibly precluding litigation, and damages are often difficult to
prove. Clearly civil remedies do not adequately protect the trade secret owner
nor do they sufficiently deter the commercial pirate.
Criminal remedies can balance the scale, however. By placing the cost
of prosecution on the state more trade secret thieves can be punished.
Furthermore, a thief can no longer escape prosecution because he is insolvent.
Present criminal remedies in Florida are inadequate to protect the owner
of a trade secret because they are limited to situations in which the trade
secret is embodied in some tangible form. Even when the secret taken is in
a tangible form, it is often not taken with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property. Hence, the thief is immune from prosecution.
To rectify the present inadequacies of both the civil and criminal protections, Florida should pass a statute aimed specifically at the theft of trade
secrets. Such a statute could clarify existing doubts as to the extent of protection afforded. Furthermore, it could eliminate technical deficiencies in
existing criminal statutes, which have freed the thief in the past. Such a
criminal statute could indicate a recognition by the state of the problem
involved in trade secret protection and would serve as a warning to prospective thieves that the state earnestly intends to put a stop to their reprehensible conduct. Finally, such a statute could have a favorable economic
impact on the state. Adequate trade secret protection would be an added
incentive for industry to establish in Florida.
WILLIAM

J.

MCCABE

APPENDIX
PROPOSED STATUTE FOR THE PRoTECrION OF TRADE SECRETS

Section I: Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(a) "Trade Secret" means any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of scientific,
technical, or commercial information which the trade secret owner has taken reasonable
precautions to maintain in secrecy so that except by the use of improper means there would
be difficulty in acquiring it, and which gives said owner an opportunity to obtain an advantage over others who do not know of it. In determining whether given matter constitutes a trade secret, the court may consider: (1) the extent to which it is independently
known to outsiders or is used by outsiders for similar purposes; (2) the extent to which
it is known by insiders; (3) the extent of the measures taken by said owner to guard its
secrecy; (4) its value to the owner and others, including the extent to which, if used
in conduct of a business, it would confer a competitive advantage on said owner; (5) the
amount of effort or money expended by said owner in developing it; and (6) the ease
or difficulty with which it could properly be acquired or duplicated by others.'
1. ABA TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHT
Trade Secrets Protection Act §1 (4)).

SECTION,
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(b) The word "copying" means making any facsimile, replica, photograph, or other
reproduction of a trade secret and any note, drawing or sketch made of or from a trade
secret.2
(c) The word "article" means any object, material device or substance or copy thereof,
including, but not limited to, any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample, specimen,
prototype, model, photograph, micro-organism, blueprint or map.3
(d) "Misappropriates" is knowingly disclosing, obtaining or using a trade secret or
inducing others to disclose, obtain, or use a trade secret without the express or implied
consent of its owner.4
(e) The word "representing" means describing, depicting, containing, constituting, reflecting or recording,
Section II: Any person who, with intent to deprive or withhold from the owner thereof the
exclusive control of a trade secret, or with an intent to appropriate a trade secret to his
own use or to the use of another:
(a) misappropriates any article representing a trade secret; or,
(b) misappropriates, by memorizing or copying a trade secret, or an article representing a trade secret: (1) is guilty of a felony if the value of the trade secret misappropriated is $200.00 or more, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period not exceeding 5 years, or in the county
jail for a period not exceeding 12 months, or by fine not exceeding $1,000; (2) is
guilty of a misdemeanor if the value of the trade secret misappropriated is less than
$200.00, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for
a period not exceeding 6 months or by a fine not exceeding $500.00.6
Section III: Every person who promises or offers or gives, or conspires to promise or offer
to give, to any present or former agent, employee or servant of another a benefit as an
inducement, bribe or reward for conveying, delivering or otherwise making available a
trade secret or an article representing a trade secret owned by his present or former principal, employer or master, to any person not authorized by such owner to receive or acquire
the same and every person who, being a present or former agent, employee, or servant,
solicits, accepts, receives or takes a benefit as an inducement, bribe or reward for conveying, delivering or otherwise making available a trade secret, or an article representing
a trade secret owned by his present or former principal, employer or master, to any person
not authorized by such owner to receive or acquire the same is punishable by imprisonment
in the state penitentiary for a period not exceeding 5 years, or in the county jail for a period
not exceeding 12 months, or by fine not exceeding $1,000.7
Section IV: In a prosecution for a violation of this act, it shall be no defense that the
person so charged, returned or intended to return the trade secret or article representing the
trade secret.s

2. N.J. Rev. Stat. §2A:119-5.2 (d) (Supp. 1969).
3. N.J. REv. STAT. §2A:119-5.2 (a) (Supp. 1969).
4. ABA TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHT SECTION, REPORT 232 (1971) (proposed Uniform Trade
Secrets Act §1 (6)).
5. NJ. REv. STAT. §2A:119-5.2 (b) (Supp. 1969).
6. The desirable aspects of this section include the fact that a person is not guilty unless
he knowingly takes a trade secret; that it is the trade secret that is being protected, not
some tangible item embodying a trade secret; and finally, that it includes depriving the
owner of exclusive control.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE §499 (c) (West 1970).

8.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§499 (d) (West 1970).
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